[58]Culler, p. 128.

[59]In making his case for the indispensability of rhetoric for understanding science, Walter B. Weimer, in *Notes on the Methodology of Scientific Research*, argues for the importance of audience in science. Too little attention has been given to "the scientific community as a rhetorical audience, as an active constructor of the scientific dialogue and the meaning that it manifests." (p. 85) The audience, Weimer explains, becomes a *persona* that researchers must engage.

[60]They are actually transparent. This is Larry Gross's metaphor. That is, like the operations of a skillful performance (and in a real sense, certain meanings do function operationally), these meanings become tacti and transparent, but they still function. Transparency serves a particular purpose – say a certain technical fluency. Overcoming transparency (what I am proposing, really) permits a writer and a reader "to utilize and appreciate a wider range of inference and association than that given by their conventional referential and denotative 'meaning.'" "Art as the Communication of Competence," *Social Science Information*, 12 (5), p. 126.

[61]Gross, "Modes of Communication," p. 62.

[62]"It takes a skilled audience to appreciate a work of art [or any other complex discourse] in terms of elements and operations which are *left out* purposively. Only on the basis of fluent syntactic awareness can one perceive absent elements and operations as part of the implicational structure of a work of art rather than as a failure of skill or patience." Gross, "Art as the Communication of Competence," p. 130.

[63]Jonathan Culler's account of literary competence as "a rule governed process of producing meanings" is obviously relevant. His account of the experience and knowledge necessary for reading literature explains in many ways the particulars of what I mean.

> This is indeed an essential fact, and one should hasten to point out what it implies: reading poetry is a rule-governed process of producing meanings; the poem offers a structure which must be filled up and one therefore attempts to invent something, guided by a series of formal rules derived from one's experience of reading poetry, which both make possible invention and impose limits on it. (p. 126)

But Culler's (or "structuralism's") emphasis on a linguistic analogy, on formal rules, and exclusively on expectations (on the reader almost exclusively) seem mistaken. Larry Gross's definition of competence seems more helpful generally, partly because it avoids the emphases in Culler, but mainly because it provides an independent basis for defining both a literary competence and a scientific competence.

[64]Theobald, p. 210.

[65]Theobald, p. 210.

[66]Theobald, pp. 208-09.

[67]Theobald, pp. 209-10.

[68]Culler, p. 136.

[69]*The Collected Poems of Theodore Roethke* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 220.

[70]Roethke, p. 220.

[71]Theodore Roethke, *On the Poet and His Craft* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1965), p. 83.

[72]Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, p. 82.

REWORDING THE RHETORIC OF COMPOSITION

by

Paul J. Kameen
Carnegie-Mellon University

> Strange philosophies have arisen upon the supposition that everything which is known to us figures in thought as a discursive communicable proposition.
>
> –S. K. Langer

I. EXPLORING TEXTS

There are dozens, perhaps hundreds of composition textbooks currently on the market. Yet selecting one for a course is most often a frustrating and unforgiving process of sifting the adequate from the unacceptable, of groping, guessing, and compromising. When confronting this seemingly chaotic array of approaches competing for our attention it is important for us to remember that a composition textbook is not simply a pedagogical device for enabling students to improve their writing; it is also a definition of what writing is and what writing is for, a kind of argument whose surface rhetoric depends on a broad web of meta-rhetorical assumptions, both epistemological and linguistic. These assumptions determine the shapes each argument can and will assume. Only by exploring texts on this level can we begin to find an orderly procedure for distinguishing various methods and for evaluating their relative merits.

From this vantage point a myriad of possibilities yields to an initial order. For there are three major foci around which most composition textbooks constellate, with each group depending on a different epistemic base for initiating discourse. These bases are (1) in the realm of forms, with particular emphasis on the abstract modes of thought that organize knowledge and discourse; (2) in the inner precincts of the self, with particular emphasis on experiential writing and authentic voices; and (3) in the domain of audience, with particular emphasis on writing as a heuristically-enabled, information-processing behavior.

On the broadest level, each of these categories is both created and bounded by certain metaphoric conceptions of the "universe of discourse" within which writing can take place. Each inscribes itself within various sets of dichotomies – thought/feeling, form/content, expression/communication, self/audience, etc. – which constrain its field of inquiry. These pairs, usually conceived as polar opposites rather than as dialectical contraries, constitute the channels along which that approach issues. On a more concrete level, each is both created and bounded by the very

particular metaphors that function as analogies for the writing process. One such metaphor is the word "exploration," which serves as a powerful symptomatic emblem of implicit assumptions concerning the nature and purpose of composition.

Thus, metaphors exert a double pressure on any definition of the writing process. Yet despite the nominal concessions that the above approaches make to the exploratory function of language-as-metaphor, each relegates language to a subordinate status in relation to some other, essentially nonverbal base for invention. And each leaves its own metaphors largely unquestioned and unexamined. This exclusion of language as a possible site for creative invention precludes the best avenue for restoring a dialectical relationship among the binary concepts that metaphorically impinge on our theories. It also makes it difficult to take self-conscious advantage of the particular metaphors, like exploration, that weave their epistemological designs into the surfaces of our texts.

I will in the course of my own exploration sketch out a few lines along which we might move toward a conception of language as a metaphor that resolves the apparent contradictions out of which current theories of composition seem to issue and around which they seem to congregate. I will turn most often to Coleridge to sustain and elaborate this counterpoint. I choose him not because he best illustrates the alternative that interests me, though he does that quite well, but because his rhetoric is one of the most widely misunderstood of all those that hover over the current landscape of composition theory.

Most textbooks currently in print ground their epistemological priorities in formalistic relationships between thinking and writing. This category of form-based texts includes all of those "current-traditional"[1] rhetorics and readers sub-divided according to classical patterns of discourse or traditional modes of analysis. I will look in detail at Frank D'Angelo's *Process and Thought in Composition,*[2] primarily because it is so forthright and enthusiastic about its biases in this direction. As D'Angelo says:

> . . . each of us to a certain extent must follow certain lines of development in our thinking because the mind is organized according to certain principles. It recognizes temporal, spatial, logical and psychological principles and relationships in the universe. . . . Principles of composition . . . are *ways of knowing.* (*Textbook,* p. 42, italics his)

And later:

> Paradigms, at least the kind that we will be concerned with, represent *patterns of thought* that give your writing a sense of direction and provide you with a formal means of ordering your ideas. (*Textbook,* p. 70, italics his)

The epistemological premises of D'Angelo's approach are quite clear: "Thinking" is a way of knowing inscribed within a finite and specifiable set of formal cognitive processes whose products are "ideas": "Every time you analyze, classify, exemplify, enumerate, compare, contrast, or discern cause and effect relationships, you are inventing ideas" (*Textbooks,* p. 42). Through its formal structures the mind invents ideas; only thereafter does, or can, one write. Thus a radical form-content distinction is central to D'Angelo's system: "The concept of structure is our model of understanding, and it is not inaccurate to separate the idea of structure

from the concept of content."[3] For D'Angelo this distinction is not simply a useful one, but one that is necessarily pre-requisite because it is genetically pre-determined:

> . . . the structural properties which underlie our mental operations must be genetically inherited. In generating discourse, the individual uses this underlying, abstract structure as a base. Then he supports this structure by filling in the details from the universe of discourse around him. (*Theory,* p. 26)

One could not ask for a starker demarcation between form and content, and the use of the narrative indicator "then" clearly separates thinking from writing not only modally but temporally. D'Angelo's claim that "one of the tasks of the rhetorician is to relate the structure of thought to the structure of discourse" (*Theory,* p. 16) must, then, be specious; for discourse is merely a repetition of innate structures of thought "filled in" with details. The only relational devices which D'Angelo proposes are syntagmatic analysis (which seeks patterns of linear sequence) and paradigmatic analysis (which seeks patterns of "dynamic organizational processes" [*Textbook,* p. 73]), both of which are simply tools for discovering implicit forms in what one reads or has written.

Such an explanation of the writing process has serious consequences on the level of intention. That thoughts can exist whole and conscious in some pre-verbal realm suggests that a writer begins with a clearly aforethought intention which language can then be used to represent. A century of debate about intentions and intentional fallacies among literary critics, not to mention the influence of phenomenological philosophies, may not have dismissed this representational notion of language from our discourse. But it should at least cause us to look carefully at D'Angelo's ontology of mind.

To be sure, when language is diminished to purely functional flesh on a form, it is difficult to see any ways in which writing can be exploratory. D'Angelo does, in fact, use the word only rarely and off-handedly. He says, for instance, that the formal categories of thought "give rise to certain questions that enable you to explore a general subject to get ideas for writing" (*Textbook,* p. 57). Exploration, like thinking, proceeds in the abstract, non-verbal realm of forms and produces "ideas," again presumably pure structures of thought that can be fleshed out with words. Writing has become here something of an after-thought (in both senses of the word); and only if it is properly prepared for on the intentional level of ideas and forms can it proceed toward its resolution in a text of organized details.

Writing is thereby reduced to a formulaic elaboration of a chosen (or assigned) pattern that pre-constitutes the text that can be produced. There are, of course, a variety of recent alternate views which redeem language as a mode of invention. But I will, as I promised, restrict my discussion to Coleridge, who, in his effort to counter certain misreadings of Plato and Bacon, argues generally against deductive formalisms. As Coleridge says:

> They both saw that there could be no hope of any fruitful and secure method, while forms merely subjective were presumed as the true and proper moulds of objective truth.[4]

What fascinates Coleridge in both Plato and Bacon, despite serious reservations in the latter case, is their concern for developing "the science

of method" (p. 361), the purpose of which is "not so much to establish any particular truth, as to remove the obstacles, the continuance of which is preclusive of all truth" (p. 357). Coleridge recommends a sort of self-conscious philosophical experimentation in which induction is guided by "the forethoughtful query" (p. 361). Thus for Coleridge "an idea is an experiment proposed, an experiment is an idea realized" (p. 362). Such experiments are by definition rhetorical and can occur only through the meditational power of language itself. Like Plato, Coleridge recommends that systems which depend on radical form-content distinctions be "resigned, as their proper trade, to the sophists" (p. 357).[5]

Between the mid-sixties and mid-seventies there was a shift away from textbooks with a formalistic agenda and toward approaches whose epistemologies were grounded in an experiential model of writing. Authenticity, expression, voice, and particularly "self" are the passwords into this arena, and many of the values associated with this mode of teaching writing are, or more properly *seem to be,* derived from the rhetoric of Romanticism that I have just counterposed against D'Angelo. I have chosen as the exemplar of this approach James E. Miller and Stephen Judy's *Writing in Reality,*[6] because it represents a broadly based devotion to the concept of self-discovery as the motive for writing and depends heavily on the familiar vocabulary associated with this notion of discourse. In addition, and this will become useful later, it illustrates a rhetoric that the "new rhetoricians" characterize pejoratively as "vitalistic," or in Ross Winterowd's terse expression, "the looky-feely-smelly" approach to composition.[7]

Miller and Judy begin their argument with a direct assualt on formalistic procedures for teaching writing:

> a student who has received exclusive training in so-called practical forms may, ironically, be limited in the ability to write those forms successfully, limited by the very narrowness of the experience. . . . [But] if you engage in a variety of imaginative writing experiences and if that engagement is personally satisfying, we think you will have enormously extended both your powers over the written word . . . and deepened your sense of self. (p. 8)

Despite this initial indication that they will keep invention at least partially in the field of language, a theme that recurs throughout the text, their argument collapses around the claustrophobic "sense of self" that concludes this passage. Language becomes something that one assumes "power over" in order to render the egocentric self.

"Each self," they tell us, "is the center of a universe. If we believe what our senses seem to tell us, the entire world is arranged around us to be apprehended by us" (p. 52). Writing, moreover, "constitutes the discovery of the self" (p. 30), and the writer must "follow the injunction to 'let the self go on paper'" (p. 40), in order to reach the ultimate goal which is to *"seek out the truth and unravel the snarled web of* [his] *motivations"* (p. 12, italics theirs). Writing then not only begins but ends in an entirely self-contained world of subjective experience.

Miller and Judy have delivered the writer out of the bondage of formal structures which D'Angelo imposes over intentionality. Yet they have delivered him into an equally confining world wherein the motivation to

write must arise mysteriously from "inner sources" (p. 5). There is not then a great deal that we can actually *teach* about writing; for as Miller and Judy inform the student in their introduction, "we feel no need to teach you about language. . . . You have the language; our aim is to help you release and control it" (p. 5). The implication is that the proper role of the instructor is simply to provide students with occasions for discourse and that they in turn will "participate more actively, directly, and consciously in that creation of the self which is the major challenge of existence" (p. 45).

This challenge is to be met by "the processes of the imagination," which "remain shrouded in mystery" (p. 6). But for Miller and Judy to think imaginatively is simply "to see things from a fresh point of view, to treat all experience, as Breton suggests, as if it is 'strange'" (pp. 72-73).[8] Breton's recommendation to make things "strange" is here reduced to seeing things from "a fresh point of view," thereby stripping off the self-transcendent possibilities that are inherent in his conception of surrealism and transmuting language into a medium that merely extends and amplifies the range of our own solipsism. To the extent that truly imaginative exploration remains possible, it is confined entirely to the enclave of the inner self.

Though the word "exploration" appears over and over again in this text, the underlying assumption about its principal function is clearly stated in the introduction: "people develop control over words as they use language for exploration of inner worlds" (p. 5). We have here not an alternative to D'Angelo's diminution of language, but a simple obverse. Language remains for Miller and Judy a representational flesh for the forms that the self molds for it to fill. The writer "controls" words by appropriating them to his "inner world." There is even, later in the book, a full retreat to a formalism that, ill-defined as it might be, D'Angelo would applaud:

> . . . there are a *variety* of forms that can be explored [or exploited] to publicize an idea . . . [and] much of the day-to-day writing in which we engage provides opportunity for genuine exploration and learning – discovering and rediscovering things about ourselves and our universe. (p. 23)

The simultaneous yokings of exploration with both exploitation and learning suggest the confused anti-formal yet representational epistemology that constitutes the sub-structure of their argument. The exploratory imagination has, again, been reduced to fleshing out forms or dis-covering "things."

Coleridge provides a refreshing and rigorous alternative to these hermetically sealed conceptions of the knowing mind. For Coleridge, the imagination makes possible not simply the self, but a truly dialectical relationship between self and world:

> In a self-conscious and thence reflecting being, no instinct can exist without engendering the belief of an object corresponding to it, either present or future, real or capable of being realized; . . . in every act of conscious perception, we at once identify our being with that world without us, and yet place ourselves in contra-distinction to that world. . . . So universally has this conviction leavened the very substance of discourse, that there is no language on earth in which a man can abjure it as a prejudice, without employing terms and conjunctions that suppose its reality. (p. 365)

Imagination is therefore a self-transcending function of mind that

establishes and maintains a balance between inner and outer, subject and object, self and nature. The interpenetrations among these seemingly incommensurable worlds are dynamic and transubstantial, a dialectic for which language is both the instrument and expression.

Coleridge does, of course, draw a sharp distinction between "nature" and "self," object and subject. But for him "in all acts of positive knowledge there is required a reciprocal concurrence of both, namely of the conscious being and of that which is in itself unconscious."[9] The self, therefore, cannot expropriate or subjugate the world. For "during the act of knowledge itself, the objective and subjective are so instantly united that we cannot determine to which of the two the priority belongs" (BL, p. 145). "Self-consciousness is not," Coleridge goes on, "a kind of *being* but a kind of *knowing*" (BL, p. 155). And what the self knows is the simultaneity of the attentive subject with the object it attends to. Most experience-based approaches to composition forsake this balancing of self and world, accomplished through language, in favor of a purely self-expressive discourse. It is such reductive misstatements of Romantic theory that the "new" classical rhetoricians call "vitalism," wrongly attributing it to Coleridge.

Such extreme self-based models have, as one might expect, excited equally extreme opposition, particularly from the "new rhetorics," which conceive of discourse not as an expression arising from the self but as a message focused toward an audience. These rhetorics are allied around a commitment to audience-based discourse, process models of composition, heuristic procedures for invention, and a general antagonism toward "vitalism."

As Richard Young explains this last issue:

> Vitalist assumptions, which have dominated our thinking about the composing process since Coleridge, appear to be inconsistent with the rational processes and formal procedures required by an art of invention. Vitalism leads to a view of writing ability as a knack and a repudiation of the possibility of teaching the composing process; composition tends to dwindle into an art of editing.[10]

What Coleridge himself says, though, is this:

> Method, therefore, becomes natural to the mind which has been accustomed to contemplate not things only, or for their own sake alone, but likewise and chiefly the relations of things, either their relations to each other, or to the observer, or to the state and apprehensions of the hearers. (p. 343)

Far from suggesting that we depend on knacks or inspiration, Coleridge recommends a methodology by which we reflect phenomenologically on the relations that exist among all aspects of the writing process: world, self, and other. In addition, he goes on:

> Where the habit of method is present and effective, things the most remote and diverse in time and place, and outward circumstance, are brought into mental contiguity and succession, the more striking as the less expected. (p. 347)

Thus his method is not only for integrating diverse materials but for creative invention itself.

Let us put aside this reference to Coleridge, who has really nothing to do with recent "vitalist" models of the composing process. What we have then is not a battle between imagination "shrouded in mystery" and cognition available to empirical study but a quarrel between process and

product based approaches to writing. Because vitalistic approaches seem to be product oriented (this is certainly untrue, even unthinkable, for Coleridge), the new rhetorics focus on the "composing process."[11]

One of the most systematic of such "process models" of composing is problem-solving, and I will use Linda Flower's *Problem-solving Strategies for Writing* as a representative example of this approach.[12] Flower's system depends immediately on certain self-proclaimed assumptions about writing as a way of knowing. First among these is the belief that writing is motivated by the perception of problems (Flower grounds her definition of "problem" in a felt sense of unresolved conflict) which, by linguistic intervention, can be solved. This problem/solution paradigm is introduced with the metaphor of writing as a goal-directed behavior, a way of getting "from A to B." The implied assumption is that a writer can confidently know, at least in all the ways that matter, where he begins (point A) and where he needs to end (point B). Thus, though the path may vary, the teleological nature of the task is prescribed, and the medium of language has value principally as the pathway between intention and effect, both of which can be distinguished clearly from the product that the text represents. We come to know, in short, by setting clear goals and using the available tools (in this case language) for reaching them.

Evident here is the powerful reverse-analogical effect of the computer on the modes of text production which problem-solving recommends. The writer, like a data bank, contains in his memory bits of information which certain mental processes, like programs, can assemble into networks. These formal processes, governed toward a goal by the assignment of a particular problem space, fill their slots with the appropriate information, the result of which is a "solution." What all of this ignores is that computers and their programs are man-made and alterably designed for particular purposes: to solve mechanical or tedious or time-consuming problems of information manipulation and distribution. The inevitable consequences of this metaphor-transformed-into-fact is the confinement of writing to a similar domain of "solvable problems," tasks for which writing is only occasionally needed. Writing, in fact, is best suited to those human problems which have no specifiable solution, even an ill-defined one, and for which the word "problem" creates more confusion than it clears up.[13]

To move most efficiently between the A-B poles of the writing process certain heuristics are recommended. These include brainstorming ("jotting down thoughts in whatever order they come"), WIRMI ("What I Really Mean Is"), notation techniques ("flow charts, trees, brackets, boxes, arrows, etc."), and "satisficing" ("Take the first acceptable solution or alternative instead of searching for the very best one") (p. 3.5). These heuristics constitute Flower's arsenal for invention, their strengths enhanced by the rhetorical context within which they are placed. For Flower posits only four alternative strategies to the ones she recommends: trial and error ("the almost random way the writer keeps trying to combine words and phrases in the hope that one version will finally sound acceptable"), the top-down strategy ("When this method works, it produces a final product in one efficient pass through"), words looking for an idea "([the writer] has let the momentum of language itself direct

composition and lead her down the garden path"), and inspiration ("the words seem to flow unbidden and the first draft is the final one") (pp. 3.3-3.8). These are, of course, widely used, and effective, composing strategies, reduced here to an almost cartoonish simplicity for the sake of a stark contrast with the heuristics presented as their alternatives. That the above definitions are derived from analyzing the protocols of writers who are faring poorly at their tasks leaves them all the more questionable.

The same technique is used later in the book to distinguish writer- from reader-based prose — to the latter's advantage since problem-solving depends on audience-basing to distinguish itself from its vitalistic competitors.[14] Writer-based, or what I have earlier called self-based prose, is in Flower's view characterized by "what psychologists call 'egocentrism.' . . . We see it all the time in young children who happily carry on a one sided conversation or a spirited but highly elliptical monologue about what they are doing" (p. 6.25).

To redeem the egocentric garble of self-based prose the writer must perform what Flower calls a "Difference Analysis . . . the first step (of which) is to make a mental chart gauging the distances between you and the reader in three main areas: Knowledge, Attitude and Needs" (p. 6.1). These differences are scaled upward in three categories: "Like Me," "Some Difference," or "Large Difference" (p. 6.1). By thus outlining a gridded difference scale between himself and his reader, a writer transmutes his hermetic self-based prose into clear, information-laden communication with his audience. There is of course a great deal to recommend in a strategy that seeks to avoid the problems associated with writing-only-for-oneself. But this one places an oppressively onerous burden of prediction and specification on the writer. That our knowledge and needs can be clearly distinguished from one another, let alone from someone else's, is by itself problematic. But that either of them can be precisely differentiated from the attitudes that organize, motivate and support them is, simply, an indefensible assumption. This becomes clear when we consider Flower's suggestions for applying the difference scale to attitudes:

> When we say a person has knowledge, we usually refer to their conscious awareness of explicit facts and clearly defined concepts. This kind of knowledge can be easily written down or told to someone else. However, much of what we "know" is not held in this formal, explicit way. Instead it is held as an image, a loose cluster of associations. For instance, my image of lakes as places to live and vacation is made up of many childhood memories and experiences. . . . [The] most salient or powerful parts of my image, which strongly color my whole attitude towards living on lakes, are thoughts of cloudy skies, long rainy days, and feeling generally cold and damp. By contrast, one of my best friends has a very different cluster of associations, and his image is best characterized by thoughts of sun, swimming, sailing and happily sitting on the end of a dock. Needless to say, we communicate on the subject of visiting a lake only with some difficulty. (p. 6.2)

To begin with, these images, as Flower admits, are themselves a form of "knowledge," and they are, as she implies, originally engendered by the extent to which needs and expectations are or are not satisfied. If, as Flower suggests, writers must take fully into account such image-based attitudinal differences between themselves and their audiences, then the writing task is not simplified but made insuperably complex. Even in the most intimate relationships a writer cannot anticipate every eccentric

attitudinal construction a reader might apply over his text. To try to do so would be paralyzing. Flower has simply cast writers out of the egocentric spaces of their own experiences and into the equally "elliptical" egocentric spaces of their readers' "inner selves."

I began my analysis of problem-solving with some attention to the notion of "problems" themselves. Let me return briefly to that terrain to consider the types of exploration that this approach allows or recommends. As Flower explains:

> Every problem has what we could call its own problem space. This space contains all the aspects of the problem: its causes, its parts, all of the possible solutions you could invent, and all possible ways to get to those solutions. . . .
>
> It often helps to think of this problem space as if it were a rather large uncharted territory. The first thing you as a writer need to do is explore this territory. (p. 4.1)

This seems a plausible, if arguable, geographical metaphor — until its definition is fully extended within the framework of assumptions I have just plotted. For, as Flower goes on, "exploration" means to "know your rhetorical problem before you start writing and polishing those sentences that are supposed to solve it" (p. 4.1). We return here to that remarkably stark, but characteristic, division of the stages of the writing process that problem-solving posits: One must first "know" his problem, as if examining all the causes, parts, possible solutions, and paths to those solutions were a fairly simple matter. Then one writes the sentences that might solve it. Then one polishes those sentences until they do solve it. One might ask how this model could be seen as metaphorically coincident with exploration. That becomes clear when Flower explains that a "major difference between good writers and poor writers is in how they explore or *represent* their problem to themselves" (p. 4.1, italics hers). The identity of exploration (an active, process metaphor) with representation (a static, formal metaphor) is symptomatic of problem-solving's chronic reliance on a formalistic epistemology and a mimetic conception of language. The writer holds and knows "problem spaces" in his consciousness, redacts them into plans, then fleshes out those plans with sentences that can be polished until the problem is solved.

All of this depends, of course, on a definition of information as bits of data available to memory and ultimately independent of the value-shaping, manufacturing mind that redeems in some sense, skewed as it might be, the self-based models of composing. That we would conceive of language and writing as a behavior utterly freed from the ethical and moral imperatives upon which we so obviously depend for the motives and the consequences of our discourse is a great sacrifice to make for a few heuristics, most of which are already available in the vocabularies of other, less formulaic, approaches for teaching writing.

In each of these approaches, radically different, contradictory even, as they might at first seem, the same end has been reached: the subordination of language to the service of something that supersedes it, whether that be our own thoughts, our own feelings, or the thoughts and feelings of our readers. These retreats to representational notions of language, for which words are harnessed to report, record or present some other, more important and distinctly separate reality, are not only

unacceptable but unnecessary. For discourse is not grounded in forms or experience or audience; it engages all of these elements simultaneously. And the locus of this synthesis is the text itself, which both enacts and creates our intentions, our voices and our audiences. As Coleridge suggests, writing is neither process nor product, it is both in the continual act of becoming one another; writing is neither self nor world, it is both in the continual act of becoming one another; writing is neither information nor expression, it is both in the continual act of becoming one another. Writing is, most simply, the potential of language being explored under the mutual guidance of writer and reader. It is work and play with words. What we need to restore to our textbooks is a recognition that invention can take place not only at the site of form or self or audience but, encompassing all of these, through the metaphoric power of language, on the locus of the text itself.

II. LANGUAGING

I have talked a lot thus far about exploring. Let me explore a little, then, in a meditative fashion, the conception of language I have hinted at. I begin with a passage from Martin Heidegger's "Building Dwelling Thinking":

> Dwelling and building are related as end and means. However as long as this is all we have in mind, we take dwelling and building as two separate activities, an idea that has something correct in it. Yet at the same time by the means-end schema we block our view of the essential relations. For building is not merely a means and a way toward a dwelling – to build is in itself already to dwell. Who tells us this? Who gives us a standard at all by which we can take the measure of the nature of dwelling and building?
>
> It is language that tells us about the nature of a thing, provided that we respect language's own nature. In the meantime, to be sure, there rages round the earth an unbridled yet clever talking, writing and broadcasting of spoken words. Man acts as though *he* were the shaper and master of language, while in fact *language* remains the master of man. Perhaps it is before all else man's subversion of *this* relation of dominance that drives his nature into alienation. That we retain a concern for care in speaking is all to the good, but it is of no help to us as long as language still serves us even then only as a means of expression. Among all the appeals that we human beings, on our part, can help to be voiced, language is the highest and everywhere the first.[15]

– "to build is in itself already to dwell": To begin to write, to begin to think about writing, to think about thinking, to think about, to perform any of these basic acts is already to have begun a composition; and the arena of this composition is language. A text *means* the instant it is initiated. It begins to issue toward itself out of these first seeds, which are language. To build a text is not then to master language but to yield to it, to let it guide meanings toward fruition. Language is not cloth for intentions abstractly conceived. Language conceives intentions and nurtures them into texts. Language is in this sense itself a "forethoughtful query" which invites certain responses, responses that do not waft in fully fleshed on the breath of inspiration, but issue forth from the dwelling of the query. And that dwelling is language. As Werner Heisenberg points out, even "natural science does not simply describe and explain nature; it is part of the interplay between nature and ourselves; it describes nature as exposed to our method of questioning."[16] Nature responds to the questions that we ask it. To build is already to dwell.

– "It is language that tells us about the nature of a thing": We do not know a thing first and then employ language to render it. Language shapes what we know, is what we know, is what we are, as we begin to build toward a dwelling of words that allows meaning to gather in the text. Meaning arises from language, not vice-versa. To create, to build, a text is to allow meaning to emerge from the inherent "logic" of language. This is not in the least to say that one writes by letting words flow onto paper without work or care. Quite the contrary. The previously noted analogies of exploration with exploitation and representation illustrate what can happen when the logic of language is *not* allowed to make meaning clear, when words in fact subvert one another and in contradiction banish meaning from its dwelling in the text. Words have, via their buried roots, a metaphoric logic that both enlarges and constrains their meanings. To use language carefully is to respect the domain that such invested meanings have both opened and inscribed. No writer, of course, can be perfectly aware of, absolutely attentive to, every word in his text (I'm certain I have misused hundreds here, and have had my own thoughts thereby misled in hundreds of ways of which I remain unaware.). But to ignore *all* the words in a text, to write as if language were one-dimensional, perfectly transparent gloss for our thoughts, is to risk finding the "nature of a thing" only by accident or chance. And the odds are heavily against it.

– "Man acts as though *he* were the shaper and master of language, while in fact *language* remains the master of man. Perhaps it is before all else man's subversion of *this* relation of dominance that drives his nature into alienation": As long as language is held subservient to something other than itself, as it is in each of the approaches I have earlier described, then the writer will be alien to his text; he will not dwell there because he is not building a place for himself to dwell. If the writer is alien to his text, so also will his reader be. And in at least two crucial ways, so also will be meaning. The first of these arises when the built text is closed to the dwelling of language-as-metaphor. Language thereby shrinks to a transparent facade which is, paradoxically, opaque to interpretative exploration. Verbal richness, "style," is absent, which, again paradoxically, obstructs entry for the reader. The second arises from the first. To dwell in language is to dwell in a "world" – to *be* "in that domain to which everything belongs" (p. 145). To subjugate language is therefore to subjugate every other aspect of the text – self, other and world; to cease to listen attentively to what language "tells us about the nature of a thing." This is, to be sure, a profoundly ideological issue, and Heidegger explores it more fully than I shall. But that writing of the sort I am groping toward here engages issues of value, often on a grand scale, I have already admitted. And it is only via this route that man's alienation can be relieved. For only when man begins to act as though *language* is the shaper and master of that domain to which everything belongs will he discover that he himself remains the master of the language that he dwells in.

– "It is of no help to us as long as language still serves us even then only as a means of expression": Language constitutes worlds; it is intimate to our knowing. It does not simply "express" the self by asserting inner experiences into the presence of others; it does not simply communicate

information by translating it from one place to another by means of codified "expressions"; it does not simply represent across an unbridged chasm referents that are out of its domain. Language is not a tool to express something else with; it is what is expressed. I find some help here, from what may seem an unlikely source, in Alfred North Whitehead's essay, "Expression."[17] His is an extraordinarily subtle and complex definition: simply put, and on the most basic level, to exist is to express. But in relation to verbal rhetoric the issues are fairly clear. Expression is "the activity of finitude impressing itself on its environment"; it is "essentially individual" in that it makes possible the "diffusion" of "novel" meanings and understandings (pp. 28-29). But expression can never be entirely eccentric and hermetic when language is its vehicle; for language is the "systemization of expression" (p. 48). Language, therefore, is innately public in that at least on the level of grammar and denotation it is commonly shared by all members of any given linguistic community. Verbal expression is mediate; it provides for individual, private meanings to be cast into public, available texts. By definition, speaker and listener are engaged in a mutual dialectic; one presupposes the other. Language preserves the commonality of speaker and listener, making meaningful discourse possible, without leveling off the range of difference that a human individual requires if he is to say something original. Language thus conceived is in its essence metaphoric; it provides for the intimate communion of "self" with "nature," "speaker" with "hearer." Words thus conceived are not signs that refer univocally to objects; they are evocative of meanings. And meanings are *made* at the intersections of self and nature, speaker and listener, constituting both at the moment of their making.

– "Among all the appeals that we human beings, on our part, can help to be voiced, language is the highest and everywhere the first": Language is an appeal, it moves toward, speaks to, approaches, and is never finally there. To presume that language is material for which we build an image of our thoughts is to cut it off permanently from that for which it is always striving: an appeal that we help to be voiced. Language opens worlds, texts, invested with meanings; it is our access to the intimacy of engagement and assent. Language is metaphoric just here – it appeals through our voice for convergences of worlds; it unites us to worlds that appeal for, and to, our knowing. Without this mediation of language as maker and shaper, self and text remain alien to one another; writer and reader have no common arena for intercourse; rhetoric is reduced to craft, persuasion to technique. We become "sophists," using language to manipulate in the guise of informing, indoctrinate in the guise of convincing, threaten in the guise of debating. Language is what we know, it is how we know, it is why we know. It is a way of touching, and teaching, as we think. It is the highest appeal that we can help to be voiced. As Heidegger reminds us:

> Thinking our way from the temple of Being, we have an intimation of what they dare who are sometimes more daring than the Being of beings. They dare the precinct of Being. They dare language. All beings – objects of consciousness and things of the heart, men who impose themselves and men who are more daring – all beings, each

> in its own way, are *qua* beings in the precinct of language. This is why the return from the realm of objects and their representation into the inner-most region of the heart's space can be accomplished, if anywhere, *only in this precinct*. (p. 132)

III. RENAMING THE IMAGINATION

In order to restore language as a functionally creative element in acts of composition, it is necessary to begin to specify those mental processes through which language enacts expression. These processes are best organized under the aegis of a concept that has long been a commonplace in the lexicon of rhetoric: imagination.[18] Imagination is, admittedly, a term that rhetoricians seldom use these days without some evident embarrassment about its anachronistic clang in conversations about sub-skills, heuristics, models, data and testability. This temerity is understandable, given the current aversion to concepts that resist quantification. And imagination is particularly unwelcome because of the abuses it fostered during its own recent stint as a rhetorical buzzword. I would like, though, to initiate an exploratory dialogue, to question some of our conceptions of this concept, to approach imagination along a few relevant tangents, all in the hope of renovating the term enough to make it serviceable again. My motive is not that of an antiquarian seeking to preserve an historical monument for aesthetic reasons. I believe that we need the term, for it allows us to say some things about thinking, knowing, and writing that are otherwise almost unsayable.

Let me begin on familiar turf, with a brief look at the term that has effectively replaced imagination as the key word for creative thinking in the vocabulary of current composition theory: invention. That this label is any less prone to the confusion of multiple definition, the ambiguity, that plagues "imagination" is arguable. But it does stand somewhere along the route toward the functional definition I am seeking.

Invention covers a broad range of discovery procedures in the various camps of the "new rhetoric," though it is almost always used to mean those ways of knowing that ultimately provide the writer with material for his text. For the problem-solver, invention results from the use of heuristic devices for generating information (generally through recovery from long-term memory). For the tagmemicist, invention involves the application of an epistemological grid for discovering what one does (or does not, but can) know about the subject-topic. Other examples include Burke's pentad[19] and Berke's 20 questions.[20]

In each of these cases prescribed strategies direct a search motivated by a need for content that applies to the rhetorical situation. The result of an effective search is the body of information required to make the text. The writer then forms this material into a coherent, working whole adapted to the requirements of his immediate audience. With the exception perhaps of the last example, these searching strategies are generally presented in contrast to classical or formal approaches to content development (the former depending on taxonomies of "topoi" and the latter on standard "modes of analysis.") Young illustrates this essential difference with a passage from Bacon's *Advancement of Learning:*

> The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention: for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon that which we already know. . . . Nevertheless, because we do account it a Chase as well of deer in an inclosed park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name, let it be called invention. . . .

Young's interpretation of this distinction seems to pivot on the "Chase" analogy at the heart of this passage. Classical invention, it implies, does not enable the discovery of the previously unknown but only summons up the already known. Modern invention, on the other hand, provides for the methodical acquisition of new knowledge in a given context.[21]

The chase "of deer in an inclosed park" is an accurate (and devastating) characterization of rigidly formalistic approaches to writing. But let us examine the proposed alternative. While there is no guarantee that the hunter will easily find a deer in the open woods, he does have a very clear idea of what he is searching for, he can make and execute plans to find it, and it is the only thing he *will* find given the goal-directed framework that pre-constitutes his search. It is on this point that invention and imagination part company. For the imagination is more like an explorer than a chaser; its mission is not to find a pre-designated something, but to discover the best of what is there to find, to creatively shape that which fills the needs of his "forethoughtful query." That may, in fact, be a deer; and it may not.

This is not to say that the imagination is entirely unfettered by any practical constraints. Far from it, as Coleridge makes clear time after time. For him imaginative thinking involves purposive (but not goal-directed) forays into the unknown. And such events are guided by the rhetorical relations that maintain among the various aspects of the process – nature, self, and audience – as they intersect in the act of composition. Coleridge's "method" is designed not only to enhance creative thinking, but also to initiate it.

Invention, therefore, is a fairly mechanical "special case" of creative thought that imagination absorbs into its broader systems. This supercession is suggested in Coleridge's distinction between the "secondary imagination" and "fancy":

> (The secondary imagination) dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still, at all events, it struggles to idealize and to unify. . . .
>
> Fancy, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with but fixities and definites. The fancy is indeed no other than a mode of memory emancipated from the order of time and space; and blended with, and modified by that empirical phaenomenon of the will which we express by the word *choice*. (BL, p. 167)

Imagination is, as I indicated earlier, guided by method, and methodological thinking is directed by the will, a kind of induction shaped by constitutive intentionality. Fancy, on the other hand, is implemented through choice, the mechanical expression of will when its mission is the routine selection of the most appropriate one from the available many. Will is synthetic: it establishes intentional relations, unifies incommensurable worlds, makes new meanings possible. Choice is integrative: it orders units, selects meanings, assembles groups. In a parallel way, imagination shapes wholes, asserts forms, constitutes meanings; fancy arranges wholes, discovers forms, constructs meanings. The difference between these two fundamental ways of knowing seems to

have been for Coleridge something like that between an original metaphor being made and a dead metaphor being used. Modern rhetorical theories do, of course, claim that invention can accomplish more than Coleridge provides for fancy. But even if invention is elevated from a subset of imaginative thinking, its function remains relatively mechanical by comparison. This is made evident in several modern theories of mind. I will consider as an example Susanne Langer, who shares Coleridge's conception of creative knowing, but seeks the sort of balance of contraries I have just described.

Langer both admits and respects a way of human knowing that does not yield to easy analysis, proof, or quantitative definition; a way of knowing that functions as a whole-making conceptual and perceptual system. This "non-discursive" mode of mind depends on "insight" as its principle instrument of apprehension. Its more accessible counterpart is the "discursive" mode, whose principal instrument is logical thought. These two modes are complementary (in very nearly the sense that Neils Bohr formulated for quantum mechanics); they constitute incommensurable epistemic systems and express themselves through different types of symbolization. Yet despite these obvious differences, Langer posits their ultimate inseparability on a phenomenal level:

> The two types of symbolism which I call respectively "discursive" and "intensive," are so different that they are supposed to be apprehended by different faculties. But as a matter of fact they are both present in almost every act of cognition. Just as it is futile to divide the mental life into sense, emotion, reason, and other separately functioning motives, so it is bootless to dichotomize knowledge into intellect and intuition, one of which excludes the other.[22]

Langer ascribes this synthetic power of mind to "understanding," and laments the "peculiar poverty of the conventional language" (p. 163) in the face of such experience. Coleridge, of course, attributes this power solely to imagination, and language is the primary instrument by which that power can be both enacted and expressed. Coleridge's enthusiasm, admirably contagious as it is, may need to be tempered a bit; language may be only awkwardly adapted to the expression of certain mental events. But we needn't retreat to the vocabulary of silence that seems occasionally to tempt Langer. "Conventional language" is impoverished because we have cut it off from its role as a functional metaphor and domesticated it almost entirely into the service of discursive thinking. Even metaphor itself has been rooted up and replanted into the various boxes we now call "tropes," thereby consigning it to a purely ornamental role in acts of expression.

Langer and Coleridge do differ somewhat in the role they ascribe to verbal language; but they share the same epistemology: to know is to interpret; to interpret is to make meaning; and to make meaning is to recognize on the phenomenal level the unity and integrity of the creative human experience – even though we can know our knowledge on the discursive level only in terms of polar opposites. Language, then, both creates and bounds the field of our discourse; it does not represent but occasions the junctures of thought with thing, self with other. It is in that sense, as Coleridge and Langer, Heidegger and Whitehead recognize, an instrument rather than a record of creative thought. To deny it that role,

either philosophically or pedagogically, is certainly to impoverish it almost beyond redemption.

Like philosophers of mind, psychologists have recently been puzzling toward a fuller understanding of the less accessible, "imaginative" ways of human knowing. This trend is well illustrated in Silvano Arieti's research into creativity, reported in *Creativity: The Magic Synthesis.*[23] "Imagination" and "fancy" are a cumbersome pair of terms in this arena also. But they are not entirely alien, in that depth psychology has long recognized a similar dialectic of knowing and has appropriated a companionable set of dual concepts: the "primary" and "secondary" processes originally distinguished and defined by Freud.

The primary processes are inherently non-discursive, essentially private ways of knowing that find expression through intensive symbolizations. Freud focused his attention almost exclusively on dreams; but this mode of inner expression, Arieti suggests, by no means exhausts the realm of possible vehicles that the primary processes can utilize. Secondary processes are, like Langer's discursive mode, those ways of knowing shared broadly across a language community, usually acquired through acculturation. Arieti, in order to take fuller advantage of the seminal possibilities of Freud's insight, has developed an alternate pair of concepts that accentuate a different aspect of the original distinction. His contrast is between "logical" and "paleological" thinking:

> In secondary-process thinking and in standard Aristotelian logic, a class is a collection of objects to which a concept applies. . . . But in paleological or primary-process thinking, a class is a collection of objects that have a predicate or part in common . . . and become identical or equivalent by virtue of this common part or predicate. (p. 71)

These categories are reminiscent of Lev Vygotsky's distinction between complex thinking, which like Arieti he associates with primitive, mythic, "participatory" ways of shaping the world, and conceptual thinking, the currency of culture.[24]

Arieti's main goal in making this distinction is to differentiate both of these ways of knowing from a third, intermediate, mode of mind, which he calls "the tertiary process":

> The concept of the tertiary process does not exist in Freudian theory. Freud has the great merit of having stressed the importance of the psychic reality as something to be distinguished from the reality of the external world. But he insisted that the two realities must remain distinguished, lest psychic reality be used as an *escape* from external reality. . . . However, when we deal with the problem of creativity, a different prospect is desirable. The tertiary process, with specific mechanisms and forms, blends the two worlds of mind and matter, and, in many cases, the rational with the irrational. Instead of rejecting the primitive . . . the creative mind integrates it with normal logical processes in what seems a "magic" synthesis from which the new, the unexpected, the desirable emerge. (pp. 12-13)

When purely paleological thinking is verbally expressed its chief characteristic is opacity, "a loss or diminution of the socially established semantic value" (pp. 81-82). When purely logical thinking is transformed into language the opposite occurs – the private is entirely absorbed into the public. In either case the dialectic necessary to creativity remains unsynthesized. Arieti makes such synthesis possible by naming a new way of knowing, which he calls "amorphous cognition," whose principal agent is the "endocept." Endocepts are neither percepts nor concepts; they

reside neither in the inaccessible realm of the unconscious, the repository of paleological thinking and its intensive symbols, nor among the commonly shared cognitive processes that make culture possible. But as dispositions "to feel, to act, to think" (p. 55), they mediate between these two domains, and in that role provide the mechanism for original thought. Such acts of "concrete universalization" result when an endocept is finally embodied in a form. The creative work issues "from a reservoir of unpredictable and incommensurable imagination, and also from an understanding that seems incommensurable and unpredictable because it derives from the potentially infinite symbolic process of man" (p. 186).

While Coleridge's definition of imagination has, in current composition theory, been consigned to the realm of paleological thought ("primitive," "mysterious," "unknowable," etc.), it is in fact far more appropriate to situate it in Arieti's endoceptual domain. Coleridge had a good deal more respect for "primitive" modes of thought than he did for the most mundane version of conceptual thinking, fancy. And his conception of the imagination does have a good deal to do with the non-discursive processes of mind. But it does not reside in anything like Freud's version of the unconscious. One can see this immediately in Coleridge's definition of the primary imagination as "the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM!" (BL, p. 167). This, of course, is an apotheosis of perception and not of dreaming. The active eye both posits and constitutes the outer world, in the *manner* of a creating god, if not in effect. Coleridge's notebooks are filled with illustrations of the essential function of emotion, feeling, in this act of organic shaping.

For Arieti, creativity depends on the synthesis of competing modes of thought. It requires that both paleological and logical ways of knowing coalesce, through endoceptual intention and under the conscious guidance of a directing and selecting will, into new and unexpected wholes. These are precisely the roles that Coleridge ascribed to the imagination and its motive principle, the will.

Arieti's research raises a host of speculative possibilities, both for philosophers of mind and for psychologists. One of the more important of these seems to be identifying the structures that provide for the interpenetrations of primary and secondary processes, despite their apparent surface incommensurabililty. For two such seemingly disparate realms to coalesce into seamless wholes – and that is what happens when both perception and conception are creative – they must share some common formative processes. It may in fact be the case that the secondary processes are simply highly stylized structural ways of knowing generalized over a long stretch of human history out of the far less rigid formative strategies of paleological thinking. And the imagination may be nothing more – or less – than the agent of that transformation and the vital route of concourse between these two fundamental modes of mind.

Both Vygotsky and Piaget suggest that such a process is repeated on a very small scale in the development from infancy to adulthood. There are, their research indicates, very powerful, if not so obvious, formative structures inherent in the "primitive" mind that allow even the youngest

child to begin to shape his world into meaningful wholes. Freud, of course, concentrated his attention only on a few of the unconscious manifestations of such processes, and he treats only two in any detail (displacement and condensation). I suspect, though, along with Arieti, that there are many other similar processes of differentation, constellation, and formation that operate "non-discursively" not only in perception but in conception. And it could well be these that human reason has formalized into the secondary processes of discursive thinking that constitute the armature of culture. If that is the case, it is through the mediate power of what I have named imagination, and through its principal instrument, language-as-metaphor, that this transformation has been accomplished. To abide by any rhetoric, then, that dismisses this creative potential, either by trivializing it or by ignoring it, is not only to misconstrue what language is for, but also to fail to appreciate what we as human beings really are.[25]

ENDNOTES

[1]See Richard Young, "Paradigms and Problems: Needed Research in Rhetorical Invention," *Research on Composing: Points of Departure*, eds. Charles R. Cooper and Lee Odell (Urbana, Ill: National Council of Teachers of English, 1978), pp. 29-48; and James A. Berlin and Robert P. Inkster, "Current-Traditional Rhetoric: Paradigm and Practice," *Freshman English News*, 8, No. 3 (Winter 1980), 1-4, 13-14, for a complete discussion of the definition and significance of this term.

[2]Frank J. D'Angelo, *Process and Thought in Composition* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1980). Hereafter cited as *Textbook*. See Charles Yarnoff, "Contemporary Theories of Invention in the Rhetorical Tradition," *College English*, 41, No. 5 (January 1980) for a somewhat different analysis of D'Angelo's rhetoric. Other textbooks which rely on similar form-based assumptions about the composing process are Michael E. Adelstein and Jean G. Pival, *The Writing Commitment* (New York: Harcourt, 1980); Billie Andrew Inman and Ruth Gardner, *Aspects of Composition* (New York: Harcourt, 1979); Louise Rorabacher and George Dunbar, *Assignments in Exposition* (New York: Harper, 1979); J. Karl Nicholas and James R. Nicholl, *Rhetorical Models for Effective Writing* (Cambridge, Mass: Winthrop, 1978).

[3]Frank J. D'Angelo, *A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1975), p. 9. Hereafter cited as *Theory*.

[4]S. T. Coleridge, "On Method," from *The Friend*, Second Section, Essays IV to XI, reprinted in *The Portable Coleridge*, ed. I. A. Richards (New York: Viking, 1950), p. 362. All otherwise undesignated references to Coleridge are from this essay.

[5]See James A. Berlin, "The Rhetoric of Romanticism: The Case for Coleridge," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, 10, No. 2 (1980), 62-74.

[6]James E. Miller and Stephen N. Judy, *Writing in Reality* (New York: Harper, 1978). This book has its roots in Miller's *Word, Self, Reality: the Rhetoric of the Imagination* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1972). Other textbooks which rely on similar self-based assumptions about the composing process are William E. Coles, *The Plural I* (Rochelle Park, N.J.: Hayden, 1979); see also Coles' *Composing as a Self-Creating Process* (Hayden, 1974); James M. Mellard and James C. Wilcox, *The Authentic Writer: English Rhetoric and Composition* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1977); William Nichols, ed., *Writing from Experience* (New York: Harcourt, 1975).

[7]W. Ross Winterowd, ed., *Contemporary Rhetoric* (New York: Harcourt, 1975), p. 39.

[8]This sentence refers to an earlier excerpt from Breton's first "Surrealist Manifesto" (1924): "If your experience isn't strange to you, it's false." Not even in this radically subjective early definition of surrealism was Breton willing to sacrifice world to self, and in "What is Surrealism" (1936, reprinted in *Paths to the Present*, Eugen Weber, ed. [New York: Dodd, Mead, 1966], pp. 254-79), he takes great pains to demonstrate the self-transcendence that surrealism requires.

[9]Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, ed. George Watson (New York: Dutton, 1965), p. 145. Hereafter cited as BL.

[10]Richard Young, "Invention: a Topographical Survey," in *Teaching Composition: 10 Bibliographic Essays*, ed., Gary Tate (Fort Worth: Texas Christian Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 20-21. This interpretation of Coleridge, and the use of the term "vitalism" – which originates in biology – is derived from an unpublished dissertation (Hal Rivers Weidner, *Three Models of Rhetoric: Traditional, Mechanical and Vital*, University of Michigan, 1975), which Young credits without quoting in "Paradigms and Problems" (see above). Weidner posits the causal link between Coleridge and "vitalism" with an argument more often based on a presumption of what Coleridge said than on an interpretation of actual texts. I am reluctant to explore his

argument in depth because it remains in the peculiar semi-public realm of dissertation publication. But its influence is, through others, becoming so widespread – its conclusions cited as if they were facts – that a thorough critique may well be in order soon. **[Editor's Note: Weidner's dissertation will be reviewed at length in a forthcoming issue of P/T.]**

[11]Most of these process models of composition are reactions not only against "vitalism" but also against the severity of form-content distinctions inherent in formalistic rhetorics. Yet most of them are, in the end, vulnerable to the same objections, largely because of their dependence on a positive epistemology. In the case of tagmemics, for example, "Kenneth Pike argues that 'certain universal invariants underlie all human experience as characteristics of rationality itself.' These invariants function as axioms in tagmemic invention" (Richard Young, "Invention: A Topographical Survey," above, pp. 30-31. See also Richard E. Young, Alton L. Becker, Kenneth L. Pike, *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change* [New York: Harcourt, 1970], for a complete exposition of tagmemic rhetoric). The key words here, of course, are "universal" and "invariant." While the tagmemic grid derived from these axioms is more dynamic and flexible than are D'Angelo's forms, it is in fact a similar map of the mind enforcing a form-content distinction that pre-constitutes any space upon which it operates. Thus, the difference between "process" – as the new rhetoricians use it – and "method" – as Coleridge uses it – is a significant one. "Processes" are formal, hierarchical procedures for inquiry; they cannot function without content, but they can be specified and taught as content-independent "heuristics" that lead to "solutions" of rhetorical "problems." "Method," on the other hand, is a dialogical procedure, the shape of which is content-dependent and cannot be precisely prescribed in formal terms; and it is ultimately related to "truth" as both the motive for and the consequence of effective rhetorical inquiry. In the most general terms, then process models emerge from a philosophical ambience imbued with Aristotelian and positivistic assumptions about human knowing; method models emerge from a philosophical ambience imbued with Platonic and phenomenological assumptions about human knowing. The former is essentially hierarchical, the latter essentially dialectical.

[12]Linda Flower, *Problem-solving Strategies for Writing*, (Pittsburgh: Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 1978). This book is currently available only in this in-house version; Harcourt, Brace has contracted to publish a market text in 1980. There are not as yet a large number of textbooks which rely heavily on audience-based assumptions about the writing process. Some examples are Maxine Hairston, *A Contemporary Rhetoric* (Boston: Houghton, 1978); Thomas E. Pearsall and Donald H. Cunningham, *How to Write for the World of Work* (New York: Holt, 1978). There are also several textbooks which define writing as essentially purposive in nature (e.g., James M. McCrimmon, *Writing with a Purpose* [Boston: Houghton, 1980]). This approach shares many of the epistemological assumptions that govern audience-based conceptions of discourse.

The term "problem-solving" originates in cognitive psychology and has recently been employed more narrowly in artificial intelligence research. For a "definitive presentation of the information processing approach to human cognitive processes" (flyleaf), see Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon, *Human Problem Solving* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972). For background on problem-solving as it has been applied to composition theory, see Janice Lauer, "Heuristics and Composition," *Contemporary Rhetoric* (see fn. 7, above); and the entire issue of *College English*, 33, No. 6 (March 1972), especially Richard L. Larson's "Problem-solving, Composing and Liberal Education," pp. 628-35; and selected articles in *College English*, 39, No. 4 (December 1977), especially Linda S. Flower and John R. Hayes, "Problem-Solving Strategies and the Writing Process," pp. 449-61.

[13]See W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," reprinted in *The Importance of Language*, ed., Max Black (Englewood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962).

[14]This preoccupation with audience as the guiding force in discourse has its deepest roots, of course, in classical rhetoric. But the theories of composition I am discussing seem to derive their framework in this regard from two primary sources: (1) Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric* (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1969), originally published in 1958. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca devote a significant portion of their compendious study of contemporary rhetorical strategies to the delineation of the "three kinds" of audience-awareness relevant to acts of composition. As they explain, "the first such

audience consists of the whole of mankind, or at least, of all normal adults; we shall refer to it as the *universal audience*. The second consists of the single *interlocutor* whom the speaker addresses in a dialogue. The third is the *subject himself* when he deliberates or gives himself reason for his actions" (p. 30). That these categories are significantly different from those implicit in formal and experiential models of the composing process is arguable. (2) Carl Rogers, whose strategies for client-centering therapeutic relationships have been transmitted into the rhetorical mainstream by Young, Becker, and Pike (see above) via Anatol Rapaport, *Fights, Games and Debates* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1961). Rogers' techniques are clearly useful for certain kinds of helping relationships in which mutual trust is already presumed (e.g., between friends), or in professional diadic relationships in which mutual trust is implicitly contracted for. But they are only awkwardly adapted to most other rhetorical situations, particularly those which involve balanced opponents competing for the assent of a larger, uncommitted audience. In addition, in my view, which is based on some training in counseling procedures, the Rogerian approach cannot be easily reduced to technique. It works well only when the proffered empathy and trust *are* genuine and are *perceived* as genuine. Thus it intimately engages issues of character and personality interaction.

For a comprehensive summary statement of the need for audience-based discourse see Ruth Mitchell and Mary Taylor, "The Integrating Perspective: An Audience-Response Model for Writing," *College English*, 41, No. 3 (November 1979), 247-71.

[15]Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language and Thought*, trans., Albert Hofstadter (New York: Colophon, 1971), p. 146.

[16]Werner Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science* (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 81.

[17]A. N. Whitehead, *Modes of Thought* (New York: Macmillan, 1938).

[18]Mary Warnock, in *Imagination* (Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1976), traces the development of philosophical interest in the imagination, from the early empiricists and Kant, through the Romantics, to a variety of recent phenomenologists.

[19]See Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945), and *A Rhetoric of Motives* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950).

[20]See Jacqueline Berke, *Twenty Questions for the Writer: A Practical Rhetoric* (New York: Harcourt, 1975).

[21]See above, "Invention: A Topographical Survey," p. 38, and Richard E. Young and Alton L. Becker, "Toward a Modern Theory of Rhetoric: A Tagmemic Contribution," *Contemporary Rhetoric*, ed., W. Ross Winterowd (New York: Harcourt, 1975), p. 132. The passage cited in both essays is from Francis Bacon, *Works of Francis Bacon*, eds., James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, Douglas Denon Heath (New York: Hurd and Houghton, 1869, Vol. VI), pp. 268-69.

[22]Susanne K. Langer, *The Practice of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1930), pp. 164-65.

[23]Silvano Arieti, *Creativity: The Magic Synthesis* (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

[24]Lev Vygotsky, *Thought and Language*, trans., E. Hanfmann and C. Vakar (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1962), originally published in 1934.

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