Chapter 6

A Polemical Excursion through "The Scope of Rhetoric Today"

A Response to Wayne Booth's "The Scope of Rhetoric Today: A Polemical Excursion"

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I

Let me begin with a brief proviso for what follows below: In most of my encounters over the years with Wayne Booth's work, we never quite connected. For a wide range of reasons, mostly generational, our timing always seemed a bit off. I read *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, for example, for the first time in the early 1970s, not long after I started graduate school. The formalist systems of the Modernist era were in their dotage, essentially lifeless by this point, and those of us fresh to the profession were busy looking for alternatives, particularly among the French theorists who were just beginning to migrate into English. Booth's argument was enough off-message from the New Criticism in particular—in his conception of the author, for example, as an animate part of the interpretive process and, certainly, in his attempt to conceive narrative as a mode of rhetoric—that it had some intrinsic appeal to me. But his method and his voice seemed dated, out of step with the next and the new, even though I had no precise idea of what that was going to be, in part because I hadn't read enough, in part because a lot of what I needed to read had not yet been written.

In other instances, Booth was simply out of touch with the politics that animated my generation's activism. I'll talk about that in relation to his essay in more detail below. But suffice it say that in 1970, all in the midst of the devastating turmoil on college campuses across the country, including mine, Booth is, despite his obvious sympathies for the political agenda driving that turmoil, always striving to be the voice of reason, the sly logician, one who seems to believe that the traditional, disciplined, measured discourse of the old order can still save the day, and ultimately preserve that old order. His was a "rhetoric of action" at an historical moment when action itself (in its mode as political activism) was the preferred rhetoric of currency. He doesn't sound quite as manic as I. A. Richards does, to me at least, as World War II looms, and he is tinkering with such things as Ogden's Basic English as potential "rem-

edies" to the "misunderstandings" that brought on the conflagration. But I see them as companionable spirits in this regard, at their separate historical moments, proffering remedial rhetorics while their preferred worlds were careening toward chaos.

At other times, Booth seemed to be out of step as a scholar, a bit overshadowed, even in his brilliance, by the projects he became a part of or introduced. For example, he wrote the introduction to Caryl Emerson's English translation of Mikhail Bakhtin's *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, which came out in 1984. Booth and Bakhtin share many fundamental assumptions about literary form, about the primacy of fiction, about the "life" of the author. Yet they have always seemed to me to be working out these problems and issues along parallel but never intersecting lines of inquiry. Bakhtin's treatment of these matters captivated me when I first read it. Booth seemed tame and labored by comparison. In general then, no matter where or when I encountered him over the course of my formation, as much as I admired him and his work, I never quite felt an intellectual kinship with him in ways that inspired or challenged my own thinking. This may not seem to be the best set of credentials for writing a retrospective piece on his essay from this seminal and now famous collection. I don't intend, though, to be dismissive. In some ways, as I think about his work now, Booth may prove to be more useful to the next generation of scholars in both literary and rhetorical criticism than he was to mine, most especially in relation to recovering some status, some life, for the figure of the author in the interpretive event. I want simply to say at the outset that his path and mine never crossed at quite the right angles. And what I offer here is more a polemical excursion of my own, in response to his, than an encomium on his contributions to the Wingspread symposium or to the field.

II

Viewed from our vantage point nearly two generations on, the Wingspread Conference that culminated with this book was being held at the overlap of several different but related tipping points of considerable historical consequence, none of which its participants would have been positioned to see clearly. There is evidence of this in the "five practical suggestions" that Booth offers to close his paper, all of which seem, in retrospect, to be grounded on the assumption that the values and procedures of the Modernist ideologies with which Booth and his colleagues were most familiar and comfortable would soon be restored, the late 1960s having been just a temporary glitch in the otherwise sturdy and functional machinery of the established system. I will talk about each of these suggestions in more detail later in my essay, but first I want first to frame out some of the conditions of change that were ongoing at that

moment, especially the parts likely to have been less visible to those in the midst of it.

One of these tipping points, I would argue, is a personal one for Wayne Booth. He could well have been, on this stage in the winter of 1970, at the apogee of his influence in the academic arenas and areas that most concerned him. His *The Rhetoric of Fiction* was one of the iconic texts of late-Modernist critical theory. He had significant standing as well among rhetoricians working in that field's more traditional neo-Aristotelian provinces. This essay, for example, is full of all the knowing nods and gestures endemic to intellectual eminence. The little "games of one-upmanship" he wants to "cut through" in his opening remarks—"A piece of rhetoric about rhetoric to a group of rhetoricians who already know more about the subject that I do? Impossible, clearly"[1]—are annoyingly cloying in that regard. Booth's attitudes and values vis-à-vis academic life and intellectual enterprise were forged in the 1950s and honed in the early 1960s. His moves betray that vintage and would soon become anachronistic.

A second tipping point is in the field of rhetoric itself. Certainly, those present at the conference had a strong sense that something "new" was on the horizon for rhetorical studies and assumed they had a role to play in it. They were right about that. What started out in the 1970s—and this conference is as good a place to punch in the "start" pin as any—as a fairly self-contained reincarnation of Aristotelian approaches to communication theory, discourse analysis, and pedagogy, a trend Booth fostered and surely felt comfortable with, ultimately bloomed and buzzed into the 1980s in all kinds of directions, with Plato, the pre-Socratics, and especially the sophists (not to mention the ways these classical texts became interwoven with modern philosophy, via the deconstructionists, for example) as animating forces. The new rhetoric became, in other words, the new rhetorics and the process of mitosis continued unabated for quite some time, in a sort of anarchic way at times that Booth would not have been entirely comfortable with.

My own area, composition studies, offers one illustration of this change. When I started graduate school in 1972, a year or so after this book came out, with a vague idea that I wanted to teach writing, composition studies was less an organized discipline than a loosely configured conglomeration of theories and practices, most of which had to do with teaching, and very few of which had to do with rhetoric per se. When the "new rhetoric" first impinged on my career in the mid-1970s, during an unusually brutal retooling of a department I was relatively new to, it didn't appeal to me much, for an array of ideological reasons that I will allude to in pieces as I proceed here. By the early 1980s, though, as what Victor Vitanza calls the "third sophistic" evolved as a reaction, "rhet"

became suddenly so intimately linked with "comp" that only a slash or a dash separated them, with the "rhet" generally coming first. That's how much things had changed and how fast. And more traditional and conservative rhetoricians like Booth were left in the dust in the process.

A tipping point of even greater magnitude was being reached on the lit/crit side of English studies. All of those powerhouse formalisms—the New Criticism, archetypal criticism, the Chicago School, etc.—that had dominated disciplinary work in English for two generations, which were essentially the only givens when I started graduate school, were almost entirely discredited by an array of systems that traveled under categorical umbrellas like postmodernism, poststructuralism, deconstruction, and feminism, all by the time I graduated into my first full-time job in 1977. It is not possible of course to fully document here the history of this rupture or its aftermath. But let me just point to a couple of texts as metonymic bookends of this conference: on the front end, the translation into English of Foucault's *The Order of Things* in 1970 and, on the back end, the publication of his *Archaeology of Knowledge* in 1972. Some of the foundational thinking for postmodernist and poststructuralist critical theory was done, of course, in the 1960s. Booth acknowledges none of it here except for Lévi-Strauss's structuralism, which he briefly alludes to later in the essay. What Foucault had to offer he would be much less on board for. Here, for example, are the opening moves of *Archaeology*:

> The use of concepts of discontinuity, rupture, threshold, limit, series, and transformation present all historical analysis not only with questions of procedure, but with theoretical problems. It is these problems that will be studied here (the questions of procedure will be examined in later empirical studies—if the opportunity, the desire, and the courage to undertake them do not desert me). These theoretical problems too will be examined only in a particular field: in those disciplines—so unsure of their frontiers, and so vague in content—that we call the history of ideas, or of thought, or of science, or of knowledge.
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> But there is a negative work to be carried out first: we must rid ourselves of a whole mass of notions, each of which, in its own way, diversifies the theme of continuity.… We must question those ready-made syntheses, those groupings that we normally accept before any examination, those links whose validity is recognised from the outset; we must oust those forms and obscure forces by which we usually link the discourse of one man with that of another; they must be driven out from the darkness in which they reign. And instead of according them unqualified, spontaneous value, we must accept, in the name of methodological rigour, that, in the first instance, they concern only a population of dispersed events.[2]

Booth's vision was not geared to this type of "negative work," and he is much more interested, in this essay at least, in procedure than theory. His *Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent,* published in 1974, could be seen as a response to the poststructuralist method and agenda. But even that early on, while the argument may still have been ongoing, the fight was essentially over. The remnants of the Modernist formalisms, including the Chicago School that produced Booth, are simply too outworn to present a formidable challenge to the new theories striding forth so pressingly.

III

The first half of "The Scope of Rhetoric Today: A Polemical Excursion" is an oddly meandering stroll of Booth masquerading as "a wide-eyed novice, coming into the troubled province of theory for the first time and asking, without shame, whatever questions pop into my rhetoric-filled, but theory-emptied head."[3] The main business of this "naïve visitor" is to provide "a rapid survey of what other practices and theories would be included, in our time, if we took seriously a pragmatic definition as broad and loose as that: rhetoric will for now be *all* the arts of changing men's minds."[4] There are many references here to the range of "polemical oratory" in the marketplace, from Marshall McLuhan to advertising to politics to the print media. But at the front of Booth's consciousness of the moment, to his credit, and recurring in example after example throughout this section, is the political turmoil that is rending the tradition-laden fabric of America's university "communities," including his own at the University of Chicago, where he is just coming off an administrative stint as Dean of the undergraduate division (from 1964 to 1969) that put him repeatedly at rhetorical and sometimes physical odds with activist students. Booth was, during this period, in his mid- to late forties, well past the thirty-year-old cutoff that, for my generation, was the age of trustworthiness (an unexamined commonplace he alludes to ironically in this talk). His attitude and rhetoric toward the various protest movements he had to confront were clearly more tolerant and admirable than, say, S. I. Haykawa's at San Francisco State, whom Booth takes a jab at for calling students "gangsters" and "bastards."[5] But the limitations, and to a certain extent the stigma, of Booth's old-guard mentality are evident at almost every turn.

For example, he discusses in some detail the sit-in at the University of Chicago the previous spring as a "rhetorical failure" "to those of us who were trying to hold the university together," in the face of those whose purpose was "polarizing the campus."[6] The sharp ethical, even moral divide that so characterizes Booth's approach to rhetorical contestation, is already in place here. He goes on:

> One could argue that the failure was one of intelligence or education in the producers of the rhetoric: surely professors of English… should have been able to see beyond the surface arguments and find topics that would have common appeal. Much of my own time during those harrowing days was spent, in fact, trying to discover with students what were in fact our common assumptions; often what I discovered were simply the widening chasms of difference.…
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> The speaker has an assumption that the situation calls for an effort of one kind or another to talk things through; the auditors, some of them, assume that the time for talk is past, since the speaker and his kind are so clearly evil that to listen to them would in itself be an evil. At such moments, any chance for a rhetoric of the classical kind disappears. Two inaccessible communities are formed, communities which are then free to harden their lines by addressing their "closed rhetoric" only to themselves.[7]

"Harrowing," "chasms," "evil," on the one hand; on the other, "common appeal," "common assumptions," "talk things through." The dark and the light are so Boothian. And he is precisely right that at such moments "a rhetoric of the classical kind" is impotent even to defuse the conflict, let alone create mutual assent. Booth is anguished and befuddled by this short-circuit in the system he deeply believes in, and he seems to have no clue why it happens. He vainly appeals for "someone to provide for me…an 'art of invention' that would help me deal with such moments."[8]

But there is no such thing, and here is why I think that's the case. What the "new rhetoric" tended to remain blind to, from the assent-oriented approaches, like Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca's (and Booth is firmly and, in this essay, expressly in this category) to the middle-ground or case-oriented approaches, like Toulmin's (whose *The Uses of Argument* gets a favorable mention later in the essay), was the importance of power differentials in calibrating the path toward assent. Booth seems even after the fact to remain deeply pained by his failure to reason with the various protesters he had to confront and with his inability to change any of their minds through discursive means. He accounts for this impotency with a critique of various kinds of rhetoric addressed "to what might be called the community of the blessed," a "band of insiders":[9] a "closed rhetoric," a "'rhetoric of religion,' or 'rhetoric of metaphysical transformations,'" a rhetoric of "'conversion,'" a rhetoric of "group therapy, of group dynamics, and of a host of staring, touching, praying, bathing, and copulating groups spread across the land in a great ecstatic glow," a "rhetoric of 'mythical comfort and communion', a 'symbolic' of unification," and finally a "rhetoric of sainthood."[10] All of these are bad, of course, because they seek to "change not just your beliefs but…you."[11]

And he quite poignantly laments his inability to "meditat[e] a long letter" to a former student, now a member of "the Weatherman crowd," a letter that might actually persuade him to abandon his radical agenda, if only to insure "his survival."[12] It is, though, precisely in rhetorical situations where power is unequally distributed that distinctions between "your beliefs" and "you" become blurred, vexed, and need to be acknowledged, even renegotiated, if "change" is to be attempted or effected.

This underlying tendency to elide significant power differences in the rhetorical dynamic is most visible to me in those versions of the new rhetoric that borrowed aspects of their dialectic method from psychologist Carl Rogers (who also gets a mildly favorable mention later in the essay.) In *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change* for example, which appeared in 1970, right around the time of this conference, Young, Becker, and Pike oriented their system around (among many other things, like Pike's concept of the tagmeme) Rogers's "non-directive" therapeutic model. But they failed to fully account for—at the level practice, especially in nontherapeutic contexts—the profound power differential in the therapeutic dyad: the therapist is preconstructed as "well" while the client is preconstructed as "unwell." The therapist inhabits the office, the client rents some time. Both parties have needs, of course, but they are of entirely different orders of magnitude: The therapist earns money by practicing a profession; the client pays money to get help. In other words, the therapist wields almost all of the real power and remains relatively insulated from dramatic risk, a fact that is innocuous in a therapeutic situation, where it is not a problem. It becomes a big one when the method is translated into public spheres, where power is unbalanced for a variety of more complex and often less benign reasons.

I took a couple of counseling courses while I was in graduate school on the assumption they would help me with teaching techniques (and they did), so I was familiar with and had high regard for Rogers's approach when I entered the profession. The insight about the limitations of that approach in unbalanced authority-related relationships came to me suddenly, an epiphany of sorts, in the middle of a tense and testy department meeting in the late 1970s. The department chair, having been brought in from the outside to remake the department with rhetorical studies rather than literature at its center, attempted specifically to implement a Rogerian regimen in our discourse that morning, so he could fully "understand" the objections that some of the established faculty had toward this particular reorientation. The "nondirective" questions were putatively framed to elicit positions as a foundation for assent. But some felt that their actual purpose was to draw out into the open all of those opposed to the changes, especially among the untenured faculty, those most vulnerable in transitions of this sort. Here was a clear instance in which, when one side holds all the power, "nondirection" is not only

inimical to mutual assent, it is destructive of community. I doubt very much that either that department chair or Wayne Booth, operating as they were *from* their invisibly authoritative positions, could even recognize, let alone admit, that such techniques were more likely to widen rather than bridge the "chasms of difference" at hand, or understand why no "art of invention" that "someone" could provide would help to remake a department collegially, end a sit-in amicably, or write that perfect letter of salvation. As Booth himself acknowledges, such "transformations lie deeper than our logic can penetrate."[13]

IV

As I said earlier, Booth concludes his essay with five "practical suggestions" that "follow from our knowledge" of "how many men are now thinking philosophically about a possible new rhetoric."[14] It's not entirely clear to me exactly what he expected his readers to do with these suggestions, but they are quite telling of his attitudes and predilections. The first has to do with the breadth and distribution of the field across the disciplinary landscape. He suggests that there is "no point in debating about how wide a field the term rhetoric covers or should cover."[15] In other words he wants a "broader" rather than "narrow definition" of rhetoric—but of what sort? Earlier in the essay he provides us with his take on the longstanding conundrum that to me is best illustrated in Socrates' challenge to Gorgias: "What is the field of rhetoric?" Socrates' implication of course is that rhetoric is *not* a legitimate field precisely because, unlike the other disciplines he lists, it has no proprietary content. Booth's initial response to a similar challenge—"you have no subject matter"—is that rhetoric can endure as a "serious" study, "only if we repudiate once and for all the notion of a takeover and embrace rather the notion of a pluralistic set of arts, learning from all relevant disciplines and indeed willing to be absorbed by other disciplines at appropriate moments.... It would thus be a kind of pluralistic philosophy not just of 'argument' but of *the whole of man's efforts to discover and share warrantable assent*."[16]

Within the context of such an enterprise, "the student of rhetoric," rather than retreating to one of the separate subspecialties, instead "finds a place as a kind of general coordinator of what he and others can find about how suasion works.... It may even be that we shall want a new term for the philosophy of suasion, reserving rhetoric for either a subbranch of the study or (as I would prefer) for the practice of the art."[17] This idea of a "general coordinator" resembles the defense of sophistic rhetoric that Gorgias and Polus make in response to Socrates' critique. The important difference, though, is that they are relativists and Booth is not. As he says:

> Popular "thinking" is now ridden with platitudes about the "meaningless universe," about the beastliness and hypocrisy of life, "the horror, the horror," about, finally "the death of God." Whereas men at one time wrote books to prove such matters, one now finds them relied on as assumptions needing no support.... [R]eason is helpless before the truths of existence, therefore choose your own poison, throw your bomb, join your party, take your drug, depending on whether it feels good to you.[18]

The litany of Booth's grievances is pretty comprehensive here. Any rhetoric without a deep and abiding sense of ethics, a stiff moral spine even, is anathema to him. He strives mightily to preserve such a rhetoric in the context of the otherwise seemingly sophistic (at best), even nihilistic (at worst), pluralism of the cultural moment. One instrument he recommends toward this end is "a survey...as complete and systematic as can be made...of what our fellows now know or are trying to discover about how men work to discover and share warrantable assent in our time."[19]

This tendency toward a synthesis of rhetorical methods and procedures is amplified in his second suggestion, which is that "we greatly need, without further delay, as many concrete analyses of rhetorical situations and pieces of rhetoric as possible," because "we are in a kind of rhetorical crisis with a really threatening diminishment in men's capacities to discover warrantable assent."[20] This is further evidence of Booth's nostalgia for the days of the academy, of the public square, when deliberative discourse rather than activist intervention was the primary means of political suasion and action. That time was already past in 1970 and would not be returning again, at least not on the terms Booth would prefer it. But the emphasis here on "concrete analyses" of "particular bits of rhetoric" seems also to suggest that there is already in place some commonly shared sense of "warrantable assent" about how this process of documentation and "teach[ing] each other" should proceed.[21]

In his third suggestion Booth continues this line of thinking by proposing "a clearinghouse for a constant scholarly and practical sifting of what is learned from our theorizing and our analyses."[22] This seems to be an administrative extension of his "general coordinator" idea of the rhetoric student, one version of which would be a "gathering together at one spot [of] men from the diverse disciplines to learn from each other."[23] The "new rhetoric" did, in fact, offer one template for this rapprochement among the many parties exploring rhetoric-related matters: historians of rhetoric, rhetorical critics in English departments, linguists in speech departments, communication specialists, and compositionists. But the fields that Booth specifically details in advance of his suggestions—psychology, sociology, anthropology, linguistics, and

philosophy—indicate that his vision is much deeper and broader than all of that. To make any significant advances toward such a comprehensive integration of rhetorical studies would require a dramatic reconstitution of the academic hierarchies, which Booth would not likely have the stomach for in any case.

Whether this is a good or bad idea for the field, it seems clear to me that things have been moving in the opposite direction, at least since the early 1980s. Rhetoric is both more pervasive and more fragmented than it was when I started thinking about it thirty-five years ago. Even in the academic provinces I tend to visit most often to do work, say, with classical rhetoric—history of rhetoric, philosophy, composition theory, cultural studies—there are dramatic differences at the level of method, supported by well-ensconced and often longstanding traditions, that are difficult, sometimes impossible, to reconcile. One effect of this is to promote a tendency toward insularity rather than interchange. Not only is there no such thing as the "clearinghouse" that Booth yearned for, there is often not even much conversation going on across disciplinary borders. I don't want to suggest that this is always or necessarily a bad thing. Only that in Booth's vision there is a deep-seated tension between his desire for pluralistic approaches to rhetorical problems (which *do* often create "widening chasms" between specialisms) and his urge for an underlying, unifying assent about the project of rhetorical studies generally, which is highly unlikely in a system inclined more toward territorial than collaborative ambitions.

Booth's fourth suggestion is another, even more practical, version of his second, proposing that "we need more scholars who are willing to dirty their hands in actual controversy." The goal here is "finding ways of addressing persuasively men in all fields" finding ways to "address popular rhetoric about rhetoric to laymen in this rhetorical age" and "adapting our various messages to more popular audiences…without shame or fear."[24] Again, how could such a broad pedagogical project be undertaken if there is not an underlying agreement about what rhetoric is and is for? And who among the experts at hand would be interested in and capable of doing it? To the extent that such explorations of the discourse have entered the popular realm, they have gotten there only more lately, and at the hands of second-generation cultural theorists, like Malcolm Gladwell, for example, whose book *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference* provides me with the tipping point metaphor I use earlier in the essay. Booth, to his credit, is actually a pretty accessible thinker and could have reached a more general audience had he or circumstances been different. But the fact that he uses language like "dirty hands" and enduring "shame and fear" to characterize such a process suggests a lot to me about why he, and those listening to him, may have chosen not to try.

Booth's fifth suggestion is perhaps the most dated and daring among them: "to organize a new version of liberal education as education in the rhetorical arts. If the graduates of our 'liberal arts' colleges were in fact masters of the arts of discovery, criticism, presentation and systematization outlined by McKeon we might find that a rhetorical age need not be simply deplored or exploited; it could become a time of intellectual and spiritual flowering."[25] The intimate relationship between the practice of rhetoric and liberal education in its broadest and most ardent "intellectual and spiritual" aspects is tacit to the general agenda of the neo-Aristotelian rhetoric of that historical moment, certainly of the one emerging from the Chicago School through McKeon. Earlier in the book Karl Wallace states this much more directly in his "The Fundamentals of Rhetoric":

> Doubtless it has occurred to some readers that the nature of public discourse is virtually the same as the nature of what used to be called liberal education or general education. It is indeed. To focus on the materials of public discourse is to focus on the substantive equipment of the liberally educated person.[26]

There was a brief fling in this direction in the early 1970s, an effort to reassert traditional humanistic values at the level of curriculum, in some cases with rhetoric as the "general coordinator" of the liberal worldview. But the various tipping points I mention earlier simply overwhelmed them. And the "business models" of universities today, most especially at the research university level where precedents for innovation are more likely to be established, do not lend themselves to this vision or to its discourse.

We just don't talk much any longer about "liberal education," which went the way of humanism and formalism under the sustained and withering critique of postmodernist theorists and the "competitive advantage" mentality of the contemporary research university, its specialisms regimented within a matrix of sharply marked lines. There is much about our work in rhetorical studies, wherever in the pantheon of departments it might be located, that remains deeply and admirably "intellectual," in the traditional scholarly sense that Booth would approve of; but the focus tends inward, to the modes of discourse characteristic of the home discipline, rather than outward, toward a broadly shared collective enterprise, like a Boothian "rhetorical criticism" for example. There is much less in our work than there was in 1970 that could be called "spiritual" in any but the most tranquilized and sanitized senses of that word. Booth may have disavowed the Mormonism he was born into, but there is an unabashedly missionary tenor to his voice and his work. A conversation about the nature of the "good," in the Socratic tradition, is still

possible to imagine in his universe of discourse, and such conversations went on routinely in universities at the height of the late-1960s activism. It's not that we now disapprove of ambitions of that sort; it is more that our highly secularized disciplinary discourses don't open up much of a space for us to think about them regularly in our public fora; and our ever-increasing valorization of research over teaching, especially in the upper echelons of the academy, makes it much less likely that we'll be talking about it in terms that relate materially to our daily work, at a curricular or classroom level, for example. And as to a "flowering," the last word of Booth's essay, well, that's not a word we use much these days. Perhaps we should.

Notes

1. Wayne Booth, "The Scope of Rhetoric Today: A Polemical Excursion," in *The Prospect of Rhetoric*, eds. Edwin Black and Lloyd Bitzer (Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971), 93.
2. Michel Foucault. *The Archeology of Knowledge* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 23–24.
3. Booth, "The Scope," 94.
4. Ibid., 95.
5. Ibid., 97.
6. Ibid., 98.
7. Ibid., 98–99.
8. Ibid., 99.
9. Ibid., 97.
10. Ibid., 99, 102–104, 108.
11. Ibid., 103.
12. Ibid., 99.
13. Ibid., 103.
14. Ibid., 113.
15. Ibid., 113.
16. Ibid., 106, italics in original text.
17. Ibid., 106–107.
18. Ibid., 111.
19. Ibid., 113.
20. Ibid., 113.
21. Ibid., 113.
22. Ibid., 114.
23. Ibid., 114.
24. Ibid., 114.
25. Ibid., 114.
26. Karl Wallace, "The Fundamentals of Rhetoric," in *The Prospect of Rhetoric*, eds. Edwin Black and Lloyd Bitzer (Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 9.